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If there is a bedrock principle of the First Amendment, it is that the government cannot 
regulate or prohibit the expression of an idea merely because society finds the idea offensive.1  The 
Supreme Court has, however, upheld the government regulation of offensive ideas on occasion.2  
The latest arena in which the Supreme Court has grappled with such a First Amendment issue is 
in the context of trademark registration.  Entities ranging from streetwear clothing companies to 
California dance-rock bands to multi-national corporations wish to protect their trademarks to 
distinguish their goods and to prevent competitors from utilizing their mark.3  Registering a 
trademark on the federal trademark register brings with it various benefits, namely constructive 
notice, prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark, and the incontestability of the 
mark after it has been on the register for five years.4  Before applicants can enjoy these benefits, 
they have to first clear the hurdles of the Lanham Act.  The Lanham Act forbids the registration of 
marks that depict or represent “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter” or marks that 
“disparage.”5  In two recent cases, the Supreme Court struck down these provisions.6  
In 2017, Simon Tam, the singer in a Californian Asian-American dance-rock group, 
applied to the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to register the group’s name, “The Slants”.7  
The PTO refused to grant the registration on the grounds that “slants” is a derogatory, disparaging 
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1 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
2 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675 (1986). 
3 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). 
4 Id. at 1753. 
5 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2019). 
6 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019). 
7 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. 
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term for people of Asian descent.8  The band members argued that while the term is a racial slur, 
by naming their band “The Slants” they were reclaiming the word and “drain[ing] its denigrating 
force.”9  Through a four Justice opinion and a four Justice concurrence, the Supreme Court 
overturned the PTO’s ruling and held that the disparagement standard of the Lanham Act was 
unconstitutional.  All Justices, while disagreeing about the analytical framework of the case, 
agreed on two things: (1) if a trademark regulation is viewpoint-based, it is presumptively 
unconstitutional, and (2) the disparagement bar is viewpoint-based.10  
In 2019, the Supreme Court evaluated the Lanham Act’s immoral and scandalous standard 
in Iancu v. Brunetti.11  Erik Brunetti is an artist and the owner of a clothing line that uses the 
trademark “FUCT.”12  The PTO refused to register FUCT to the trademark register, describing the 
mark as “highly offensive” and “vulgar” and concluding that it has “negative sexual 
connotations.”13  A majority of the Court, looking at “immoral and scandalous” as a single standard 
rather than considering the two words as distinct standards,14 overturned the PTO’s decision and 
found that the immoral and scandalous bar was viewpoint-based.15  
While Iancu v. Brunetti was a personal victory for Erik Brunetti, it is yet unclear how 
exactly trademark law will develop as a result of the decision.  Many legal commentators are now 
speculating that the Supreme Court has handed off the question to Congress.  The opinion 
 
8 Id.  
9 Id. 
10 See Matal, 137 S. Ct.  Justice Alito announced the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Thomas, and Justice Breyer join.  Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan, 
concurred in the judgment.  
11 See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019). 
12 Id. at 2297. 
13 Id. at 2298. 
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 2299.  
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contained both subtle and explicit hints that Congress could rewrite the Lanham Act.16  
Unfortunately, the Court has not given Congress a clear guideline.  An eight-Justice Court agreed 
that the disparagement clause violated the First Amendment, but the opinion left many open 
questions regarding how to analyze Lanham Act First Amendment issues.17  In Brunetti, the 
majority opinion did not rule on whether trademark registration represented a government subsidy, 
a limited public forum, or government speech.18  Additionally, the government and Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent in particular argued that the immoral and scandalous standard should not be 
considered a unitary standard, but rather as two distinct standards.19  They suggest that the Lanham 
Act could be saved by narrowing the definition of “scandalous.”20  Such a narrower standard would 
regulate marks merely because of their “mode of expression” rather than viewpoint, resulting in 
viewpoint neutral regulation.21 
This Comment will attempt to determine whether a distinction between viewpoint and 
mode of expression is viable, and whether it sufficiently narrows the Lanham Act to cure its 
constitutional deficiencies.  Part II will set out in greater detail trademark law and the trademark 
registration process.  Part III will review the Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti decisions, focusing 
on the various Justices’ reasonings.  Part IV will consider the Supreme Court’s precedent in regard 
 
16 See Samuel Hine, The Supreme Court Just Ruled in Favor of Fuct, GQ (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.gq.com/story/fuct-iancu-v-brunetti-supreme-court-ruling; Emily Tillett, Supreme Court Rules FUCT 
Brand Should Be Allowed Trademark, CBS NEWS (June 24, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/supreme-court-
rules-that-fuct-brand-should-be-allowed-trademark/; Howard Michael, Iancu v. Brunetti: Supreme Court Strikes 
Down "Scandalous Marks" Ban, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/iancu-v-brunetti-supreme-court-strikes-down-scandalous-marks-ban. 
17 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).  Justice Alito’s opinion left open the possibility that Lanham Act First 
Amendment issues could be analyzed under a public forum or commercial speech framework.  Id. at 1763 n.16; id. at 
1764 n.17.  Furthermore, while Justices Alito, Thomas, Roberts, and Breyer found that trademark registration did not 
constitute a federal subsidy, the four concurring Justices did not reach the subsidy issue.  See Matal, 137 S. Ct.  As 
such, no majority exists as to whether federal trademark registration constitutes a federal subsidy.  
18 See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019). 
19 Id. at 2301; id. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
20 See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 
21 Id. at 2309. 
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to distinguishing mode of expression from viewpoint, focusing on whether the Court recognizes 
mode of expression as a distinct component of speech.  This Part highlights the fact that the Court 
has not fully accepted mode of expression as a distinct component of speech and has not treated 
mode of expression in a consistent manner.  Part V will look at communication theory to determine 
whether mode of expression can be separated from viewpoint and message, and, if it can, whether 
regulating the mode of expression is viewpoint neutral.  This Part suggests that mode of expression 
likely cannot be separated from the message or the viewpoint of the speaker.  Even if it could, 
regulating mode of expression inevitably regulates viewpoint.  Part VI will conclude that 
narrowing the Lanham Act’s “scandalous” provision to merely cover modes of expression would 
not result in viewpoint neutrality.  
II. Trademarks and Federal Registration 
Trademarks were not established by federal law and historically were under the purview 
of the states.22  The key idea behind trademarks and trademark protection is that recognizable 
marks, such as “words, names, symbols, and the like,” help distinguish a business’s goods from 
the goods of another business and allow consumers to distinguish and purchase the goods they 
want.23  The federal government began to regulate trademarks in the 1870’s, but the foundation of 
modern federal trademark law was the Lanham Act of 1946.24  By the time the federal government 
became involved, the nature of trademarks had changed.  By the 20th century, trademarks “had 
expanded far beyond phrases” that simply identified a good.25  Modern trademarks often 
“consisted of catchy phrases that convey a message.”26  
 
22 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. 
23 Id. at 1751 (quoting B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 142 (2015)).  
24 Id. at 1751–53. 
25 Id. at 1752. 
26 Id. 
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The Lanham Act allowed trademarks to be filed on a “principal register,” a federal register 
of trademarks, with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).27  Filing a trademark 
registration with the PTO involves paying a fee, filing an application, and filing a verified 
statement.28  The application needs to include the applicant’s domicile and citizenship, the date of 
the first use of the mark, the date of the first use of the mark in commerce, the goods connected to 
that mark, and a drawing of the mark.29  If the mark meets all of the above requirements, 
registration is mandatory unless the mark falls into the Lanham Act’s other statutory provisions.30  
The statutory provision relevant to this Comment sets out that the PTO cannot register a 
trademark that “comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may 
disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into 
contempt, or disrepute.”31  This Comment will be focusing on trademarks that fall into the 
“immoral and scandalous” or “disparaging” category.  
In evaluating whether a trademark violates the disparagement clause, the PTO examiner 
applies a two-part test.32  The examiner first considers “the likely meaning of the matter in 
question, taking into account not only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the matter 
to the other elements in the mark, the nature of the goods or services, and the manner in which the 
mark is used in the marketplace.”33  If the PTO examiner finds that the meaning refers to 
“identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols,” the examiner moves to the second 
step, which is determining “whether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial composite 
 
27 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2019). 
28 Id. § 1051(a). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. §1052(a) (requiring that “[n]o trademark . . . shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of 
its nature unless” it falls within an enumerated statutory exception). 
31 Id. 
32 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753 (2017) (quoting Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure ¬ß1203.03(b)(i) 
(Apr. 2017), http://tmep.uspto.gov).  
33 Id. 
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of the referenced group.”34  If the examiner finds that a “substantial composite . . . of the referenced 
group would find the proposed mark . . . to be disparaging in the context of contemporary 
attitudes,” there is a prima facie violation of the disparagement clause, and the burden shifts to the 
applicant to prove that the trademark is not disparaging.35  
For the immoral and scandalous clause of the Lanham Act, the PTO applies the bar as a 
“unitary provision,” rather than treating the two adjectives separately.36  To determine whether a 
mark fits into the category, the PTO asks whether a “substantial composite of the general public” 
would find the mark “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety”; “giving offense to the 
conscience or moral feelings”; “calling out for condemnation”; “disgraceful”; “offensive”; 
“disreputable”; or “vulgar.”37  If so, then the PTO may refuse to register the mark due to the 
“immoral and scandalous” standard in the Lanham Act.   
It is important to note that registration of a trademark is not necessary for the trademark to 
be enforceable in court.38  A valid, unregistered trademark can still be used in commerce,39  and a 
trademark is also enforceable under state law.40  That said, federal registration imparts “important 
legal rights and benefits on trademark owners who register their marks.”41  Registration on the 
principal, federal register (1) “serves as ‘constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership’ 
of the mark”;42 (2) “is ‘prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the 
registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right 
 
34 Id. at 1753–54 (quoting Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure ¬ß1203.03(b)(i) (Apr. 2017), 
http://tmep.uspto.gov). 
35 Id. at 1754. 
36 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019). 
37 In re Brunetti, 877 F. 3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  
38 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1752.  
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1753.  
41 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 172 (2015).  
42 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2019)).  
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to use the registered mark in commerce . . ..’”;43 and (3) can make a mark “‘incontestable’” once 
a mark has been registered for five years.44  Registration also allows the trademark holder “to stop 
the importation into the United States of articles bearing an infringing mark.”45  While registration 
is not necessary to enjoy the benefits of a valid trademark, registering a trademark with the federal 
register imparts various benefits on the trademark holder.  Today, there are over two million 
federally registered trademarks.46   
III. The Supreme Court’s Invalidation of the Disparagement Clause and the 
“Scandalous and Immoral” Clause 
The Court invalidated the disparagement clause in the 2017 case, Matal v. Tam. Matal v. 
Tam concerned a trademark registration application for a California band called “The Slants.”47  
Simon Tam is the singer of the Asian-American dance-rock group, who stated that he chose the 
name to “reclaim” and “take ownership” of Asian stereotypes.48  The PTO denied the application 
based on the disparagement clause in the Lanham Act,49 basing its decision on the finding that “the 
band’s name has been found offensive numerous times.”50  The PTO pointed to a cancelled 
performance by the band and several bloggers and commentators who had been offended by the 
band’s name.51  Tam appealed the PTO’s decision in federal court.52  The Federal Circuit 
overturned the PTO’s decision, holding that the disparagement clause is facially unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause.53  The majority found that the clause was a 
 
43 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2019)). 
44 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b) (2019)). 
45 See 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (2019). 
46 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017). 
47 Id. at 1751. 
48 Id. at 1754. 
49 Id. at 1751. 
50 Id. at 1754. 
51 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1754.  
52 Id. at 1754. 
53 Id. at 1754. 
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viewpoint-based regulation of the expressive component of trademarks.54  It also found that 
trademarks were not commercial speech.55  The Government appealed the decision to the Supreme 
Court.56 
The key issue in Matal was whether the disparagement clause violates the First 
Amendment.  Justice Alito addressed the government’s arguments that: (1) trademarks are 
government speech, not private speech; (2) trademarks are a form of government subsidy; and (3) 
the constitutionality of the disparagement clause should be tested under a new “government-
program” doctrine.57  
Justice Alito quickly dismissed the idea that trademarks are a form of government speech.  
He compared Matal to Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., in which the 
Court held that Texas specialty license plates were government speech.58  The Walker Court rested 
its decision on three factors.59  First, the Court found that license plates convey state messages.60  
Second, license plates “are often closely identified in the public mind” with the State, since they 
are manufactured and owned by the State, generally designed by the State, and serve as a form of 
“government ID.”61  Third, Texas “maintain[ed] direct control over the messages conveyed on its 
specialty plates.”62  None of these factors apply to trademark registration.  Additionally, Justice 
Alito noted that if trademark registration is in fact government speech then “the Federal 
Government is babbling prodigiously and incoherently.”63  The government would be endorsing a 
 
54 Id. at 1754. 
55 Id. at 1754. 
56 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1755. 
57 Id. at 1757.  
58 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253 (2015).  
59 See id. at 2247. 
60 Id. at 2248. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 2249. 
63 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017). 
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vast variety of products and saying contradicting things.64  Justice Alito thus held that trademarks 
are private, not government speech.65 
Justice Alito also quickly dismissed the idea that trademarks are government subsidies.  He  
concluded that trademarks are not subsidies because the government is not giving out “cash 
subsidies or their equivalent.”66  Even though in past cases the Court has considered tax benefits 
as subsidies, he held that the federal trademark registration program is nothing like a government 
subsidy program.67  The PTO does not pay money to parties seeking registration of a mark.  On 
the contrary, an applicant for registration must pay the PTO a filing fee of $225-$600.68  To 
maintain federal registration, the holder of a mark must also pay a fee of $300-$500 every 10 
years.69  Furthermore, Justice Alito stipulated that numerous government registration schemes 
exist, such as for motor vehicles and fishing permits, and merely because there is an incidental 
benefit in registering something, it cannot be said that the government is subsidizing it.70  Justice 
Alito thus found that trademark registration was not a government subsidy program. 
Finally, Justice Alito considered whether trademark registration creates a “government 
program.”  He found that the “government program” doctrine merges the subsidy and government 
speech arguments into one and constructs a broader doctrine that could possibly cover 
trademarks.71  The Court refused to extend the government program doctrine to cover trademark 
registration, as the government program doctrine cases “occupy a special area of First Amendment 
case law” and are “far removed” from the realm of trademarks.72  Justice Alito then considered 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1760. 
66 Id. at 1761. 
67 Id. at 1761. 
68 37 C.F.R. § 2.6(a)(1) (2020). 
69 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1761. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 1761–62 
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whether the federal trademark register is a public forum.73  When the government creates a public 
forum, in either a literal or “metaphysical” sense, some content- and speaker-based restrictions 
may be permissible.74  Even in such cases, “viewpoint discrimination” is not permissible.75  Justice 
Alito thus turned to whether the disparagement standard constituted viewpoint discrimination.  He 
found that it did.  Justice Alito noted that because the PTO denied registration to any mark that is 
offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of any group, it is viewpoint discrimination.76  
He concluded that “giving offense is a viewpoint,” and invalidated the disparagement clause.77    
All Justices agreed that trademarks are not government speech, and that the disparagement 
clause is viewpoint-based and therefore in violation of the First Amendment.78  Justice Kennedy, 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, wrote the four-Justice concurrence.  He 
quickly concluded that the disparagement clause was viewpoint discrimination, because it allowed 
an applicant to register a “positive or benign mark” but not a “derogatory” one.79  Justice Kennedy 
then addressed the government’s arguments, beginning with the assertion that the law was 
viewpoint neutral because it applied to any trademark that demeans or offends.80  Citing 
Rosenberger, Justice Kennedy concluded that preventing all sides from criticizing their opponents 
makes a law more viewpoint-based, not viewpoint neutral.81  By requiring that a trademark be 
positive and non-derogatory the law “might silence dissent and distort the marketplace of ideas.”82  
 
73 Id. at 1763.  
74 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830–31 (1995). 
75 Id. at 831. 
76 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763.  
77 Id. 
78 See Matal, 137 S. Ct.  
79 Id. at 1766.   
80 Id. 
81 Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831–832 (1995) (“The . . . declaration 




Justice Kennedy saw the requirement of viewpoint neutrality as more than simply protecting the 
“right to identify with a particular side,” but rather as guaranteeing a right to “create and present 
arguments” for various positions in ways the speaker chooses.83   
Justice Kennedy then addressed the government’s next argument, that the law was 
viewpoint neutral because registration was denied based on the expected reaction of the audience, 
not the applicant’s personal views.84  Justice Kennedy concludes that a law does not become 
viewpoint neutral merely because the censorship is tied to the reaction of the audience.85  The 
danger of viewpoint discrimination is the government attempting to remove certain ideas from the 
broader public debate, and that danger is exacerbated if those ideas are offensive.86  An offensive 
idea can lead to reflection and more debate, resulting in a “more reasoned, more tolerant” 
position.87  Additionally, Justice Kennedy found that ultimately, when it comes to Lanham Act 
issues, it was the PTO deciding which ideas led to the audience taking offense.88  As such, it is 
difficult to remove the government’s own opinion from the PTO’s decisions.89  
Yet, unlike Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy did not reach the questions of whether trademark 
registration is a government subsidy or a public forum.90  The Court’s unclear position on such 
questions, along with Justice Alito’s, Justice Breyer’s, Chief Justice Robert’s, and Justice 
Thomas’s opposition to considering trademark registration a government subsidy or a public 
forum, played a key role in the Iancu v. Brunetti decision two terms after Matal.   
 
83 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1766.  
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 1767. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1767.  
90 See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
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In Iancu v. Brunetti, Erik Brunetti, an artist and founder of the “FUCT” clothing line, 
attempted to register the “FUCT” trademark.  The PTO did not grant registration, and a PTO 
attorney described the mark as “vulgar” and “unregistrable.”91  The PTO officer further thought 
that the mark communicated “misogyny, depravity, [and] violence,” and concluded that “whether 
one considers [the mark] as a sexual term, or finds that [Brunetti] has used [the mark] in the context 
of extreme misogyny, nihilism or violence, [it has] no question but that [the term is] extremely 
offensive.”92  The PTO thus found the mark unregistrable based on the “immoral and scandalous” 
clause of the Lanham Act.  Brunetti then brought a facial challenge to the “immoral and 
scandalous” clause to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.93  The appellate court found 
the “immoral and scandalous” clause to violate the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.94   
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether denying a trademark registration because the 
mark is “immoral and scandalous” is a violation of the First Amendment.  The majority began by 
clarifying that because the PTO applies “immoral and scandalous” as one standard, it too would 
consider the two words as one standard.95  Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan found that based 
on the dictionary definitions of immoral “the Lanham Act permits registration of marks that 
champion society’s sense of rectitude and morality, but not marks that denigrate those concepts.”96  
Based on the dictionary definitions of scandalous “the Lanham Act allows registration of marks 
when their messages accord with, but not when their messages defy, society’s sense of decency or 
propriety.”97  Put together, Justice Kagan concluded that the definitions meant that the Lanham 
Act allows the registration of trademarks when society in general approves of them from a moral 
 






97 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2300. 
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or decency viewpoint, but does not allow registration when society would condemn the 
viewpoint.98  The law has a facial viewpoint bias which “results in viewpoint-discriminatory 
application.”99   
The Government argued that the statute can be narrowed to “marks that are offensive [or] 
shocking to a substantial segment of the public because of their mode of expression, independent 
of any views that they may express.”100  The Government explained that such an interpretation 
would limit the Lanham Act to marks that are “vulgar”—meaning “lewd,” “sexually explicit or 
profane.”101  Such a regulation, according to the Government, would not turn on viewpoint and the 
PTO could enforce it.102  The majority did not rule on whether the government’s narrowing 
construction would solve the First Amendment issues because it stated that the narrow 
interpretation was not supported by the text of the statute in its current form.103   
Several Justices alluded to or explicitly supported Congress revising the text of the statute.  
Justice Alito in his concurrence made clear that “[the Supreme Court’s] decision did not prevent 
Congress from adopting a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks 
containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.”104  Chief Justice Roberts 
seemed to agree with the government’s interpretation of “scandalous.”  Concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, he agreed with the majority’s analysis of the “immoral” clause but thought that 
“scandalous” was separable from immoral.105  He argued that the term “scandalous” does not need 




100 Id. at 2301. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 




more narrowly to bar only marks that offend because of their mode of expression—marks that are 
obscene, vulgar, or profane.”106  Justice Breyer, pointing to Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence and 
dissent, agreed that the Court should interpret the word “scandalous” in the statute to refer only to 
highly “vulgar” or “obscene” modes of expression.107  
Justice Sotomayor offered the most comprehensive analysis of how the Government’s 
argument—narrowing the Lanham Act along the “scandalous” standard—could be effectuated.  
Justice Sotomayor argued that it is “possible to read that provision’s bar on the registration of 
‘scandalous’ marks to address only obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity.”108  Offensiveness could 
result from the views expressed, but it could also result from the way in which those views are 
expressed: using a manner of expression that is “shocking to [one’s] sense of . . . decency” or 
“extremely offensive to the sense of . . . propriety.”109  She concluded that the word “scandalous” 
on its own is ambiguous.110  It can be read broadly (to cover both offensive ideas and offensive 
manners of expressing ideas), or it can be read narrowly (to cover only offensive modes of 
expression).”111  Justice Sotomayor concluded that because Congress would not have put 
duplicative or unnecessary words into a statute, Congress must have intended “scandalous” to be 
distinct from “immoral.”112  Thus, while “immoral” and “disparaging” cover marks that are 
offensive because of the ideas they express, “scandalous” covers marks that are offensive because 
of their mode of expression, separate from a message or viewpoint.113   
 
106Id. at 2303. 
107 Id. at 2304. 
108 Id. at 2308. 
109 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2309. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 2309. 
112 Id. at 2310. 
113 Id. at 2310. 
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In that sense, the “scandalous” standard could be used to regulate marks that are expressed 
in a shocking or offensive manner, such as when the speaker employs obscenity, vulgarity, or 
profanity.114  Obscenity has been defined by the Court numerous times.115  As for vulgarity and 
profanity, Justice Sotomayor did not precisely define those terms.  She stated that she “interpret[s] 
the term to allow the PTO to restrict . . . the small group of lewd words or ‘swear’ words that cause 
a visceral reaction, that are not commonly used around children, and that are prohibited in 
comparable settings.”116  Justice Sotomayor argues that when narrowed, “scandalous” is a 
viewpoint-neutral form of content discrimination that is permissible in the kind of discretionary 
governmental program or limited forum typified by the trademark-registration system.117     
IV. Supreme Court Precedent  
It is unlikely that “scandalous” could be sufficiently narrowed by redefining the term as 
regulating mode of expression rather than viewpoint.  As it stands, the Court does not have a 
comprehensive method of dealing with mode of expression or distinguishing modes of expression 
from message or viewpoint.118  The Court has occasionally made the distinction, but it has 
inconsistently applied the law to that distinction. 
A. Justice Sotomayor has not sufficiently distinguished Cohen v. California   
The natural starting point is the landmark case of Cohen v. California, which presents a 
somewhat similar situation to Iancu v. Brunetti. During the Vietnam War, the defendant, Cohen, 
entered a courthouse with the words “Fuck the Draft” prominently displayed on the back of his 
jacket.119  The defendant was convicted in Municipal Court of violating a part of a California 
 
114 Id. at 2311. 
115 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973).  
116 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2311.  
117 Id. at 2313.  
118 See Alan Howard, The Mode in the Middle: Recognizing a New Category of Speech Regulations 
for Modes of Expression, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 47 (2007).  
119 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).   
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statute that prohibits “’maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any 
neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct . . ..’”120  The defendant testified in court that 
he wore the jacket as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the 
Vietnam War and the draft.121  The Court of Appeals affirmed and the California Supreme Court 
declined review.122  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.123   
The Court made clear in Cohen that the fact that unwilling onlookers may be present to see 
Cohen’s “distasteful mode of expression,” does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all 
speech capable of giving offense.”124  The Court noted that the government’s prerogative to shut 
down “discourse solely to protect others from hearing it” depends on “a showing that substantial 
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”125  Otherwise, a majority 
could simply silence dissidents “as a matter of personal predilections.”126  The Court then framed 
the issue as whether California can label Cohen’s actions as “offensive conduct” and remove a 
phrase from the public discourse on either the theory that it is likely to cause a violent reaction or 
on the theory that the States can act as “guardians of public morality” and remove words from the 
public vocabulary.127   
The Court dismissed the violent reaction theory quickly, by stating that the government did 
not present any evidence showing that sections of the public were prepared and willing to strike 
out against an person’s use of a curse word.128  The Court then dismissed the public morality theory 
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on several grounds.129  First, the Court stated that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”130  It is 
hard to draw lines as to what kind of language is vulgar and what kind of language is not.  Second, 
the Court stated that the state “has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is 
grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us.”131  It is difficult for government 
officials to make decisions in this area, which is why the Constitution left it to the individual.132  
Finally, the Court argued that “much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative 
function.”133  Part of communication consists of only ideas which are capable of being separated 
from the mode of expression, but a part of communication also expresses “otherwise inexpressible 
emotions.”134   
Brunetti cited Cohen to argue that the restriction at issue in Iancu v. Brunetti was viewpoint 
discrimination. But Justice Sotomayor argued that Cohen did not reach as far as Brunetti claimed 
it did.135  She attempted to distinguish Cohen by arguing that the Court did not suggest that the 
State had targeted Cohen to suppress his specific, anti-war viewpoint, such that it would have 
accepted a similarly vulgar statement in support of the draft.136  Rather, Justice Sotomayor 
suggested that the State had simply engaged in what later courts would call viewpoint-neutral 
content discrimination—it had regulated “the form or content of individual expression.”137  Justice 
Sotomayor further argued that the Cohen Court’s language, stating that words are chosen for their 
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restriction on profanity is a viewpoint-neutral form of content discrimination.138  Cohen’s 
discussion did not go further to say that a regulation that treats all instances of profanity equally is 
nevertheless by nature an instance of “the government target[ing] . . . particular views taken by 
speakers on a subject.”139  According to Justice Sotomayor, Cohen therefore did not resolve this 
case in Brunetti’s favor.  While Brunetti, much like Cohen, was subject to content discrimination, 
that discrimination was a viewpoint neutral regulation of Brunetti’s mode of expression.    
Yet, Justice Sotomayor does not address all of the Cohen Court’s reasoning.  Her argument 
is a viable one if the mode of expression can truly be separated from the viewpoint.  The Cohen 
Court was keenly aware of how the regulation of specific, offensive words could affect viewpoint, 
albeit without ever using the term “viewpoint”.140  In concluding his majority opinion Justice 
Harlan stated that the Court “cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular 
words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”141  He continued 
by noting that the government might “seize upon the censorship of particular words” to ban the 
“expression of unpopular views.”142  The Court in Cohen explicitly stated that even if it considered 
offensive words as modes of expression, it is dubious that prohibiting words would not also run 
the risk of limiting viewpoints.   
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The Court in Cohen was also aware the value profanity and offensiveness have in emotive 
speech and expressing emotion.  It expressly stated that vulgarity, used as a tool to express 
emotion, directly affects the speaker’s message.143  Justice Harlan stated that the Court cannot 
“sanction” the view that the Constitution, while “solicitous of the cognitive content of individual 
speech,” ceases to care about the “emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the 
more important element of the overall message. . ..”144  While Cohen did not go on to state that the 
government cleansing the public discourse of profanity is viewpoint-based discrimination, it was 
aware that regulating the use of certain words can have that effect.   
It is also important to remember that the Court in Cohen did not need to reach the question 
of whether offensiveness constitutes a viewpoint.  The fact that the California law was a content-
based regulation of speech was enough for the Cohen Court to apply heightened scrutiny in the 
criminal context.145  Thus, Justice Sotomayor’s assertion that the Cohen Court did not discuss 
whether the state law was viewpoint discriminatory is accurate.  That is not the same, however, as 
concluding that the Court said that the law was viewpoint neutral.  The state law in Cohen may 
well have been viewpoint discriminatory, but the Cohen Court did not need to reach the issue of 
viewpoint to apply heightened scrutiny.  Moreover, in light of Matal v. Tam, it is likely that the 
state law in Cohen was viewpoint discriminatory.  Justice Alito concluded his opinion with the 
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phrase: “giving offense is a viewpoint.”146  Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Justice 
Sotomayor a mere two terms before Iancu v. Brunetti, invalidated Justice Sotomayor’s argument 
in Brunetti.  He found that merely because a law limited and regulated speech on all sides did not 
make it viewpoint neutral, but rather more viewpoint-based.147  Regardless whether decided 
through Justice Alito’s or Justice Kennedy’s framework from Matal, Cohen would likely be 
considered viewpoint discriminatory today.  
B. The Supreme Court is inconsistent with how it treats modes of expression  
Looking beyond Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court’s precedent when it comes to 
modes of expression and their effect on viewpoint is inconclusive.  Professor Alan Howard argues 
in his article that for the Supreme Court the crucial issue with distinguishing mode of expression 
from content and viewpoint began in 1986 with City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.148  In 
Renton, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a zoning ordinance that prohibited 
adult motion picture theaters from being within 1,000 feet of a residential zone, single or 
multifamily dwelling, church, park, or school.149  Based on the definitions, the ordinance was 
content-based on the basis of subject matter, as it applied only to sexual content.  The Court 
nevertheless treated the law as content-neutral, because it was motivated by a decision to control 
the secondary effects of adult theaters and not by a motivation to restrict speech.150  According to 
Professor Howard, Renton broke the classic content-based/content-neutral dichotomy the Court 
traditionally used and “over the years has produced a panoply of confusing and often incoherent 
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analyses.”151  He argued that this case is really the beginning of several Supreme Court cases that 
upheld a statute based on its regulation of a mode of expression.152    
The Court has held many times that certain modes of expression can be proscribed by the 
government without violating First Amendment law.  Justice Sotomayor’s argument attempts to 
equate obscenity, vulgarity, or profanity with those proscribed modes of expression.  The question 
is thus whether mode of expression is separable from viewpoint, and, if it is, whether regulating 
modes of expression affects viewpoint.    
i. Obscenity is outside the scope of the First Amendment and likely does not 
sufficiently narrow the “scandalous” standard 
First, while Justice Sotomayor lists obscenity alongside vulgarity and profanity, obscenity 
is distinct from the other terms.  The Court often describes obscenity as being outside of the First 
Amendment protected speech altogether.153  Obscenity is defined narrowly by the Court.  When a 
court must decide whether a proscribed form of communication is obscenity the basic guidelines 
for the trier of fact are (a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether 
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by 
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.154    
Justice Sotomayor is correct that government can proscribe obscene language and obscene 
modes of expression, but a trademark like Brunetti’s, for example, would certainly not meet the 
standard described in Miller v. California.  The trademark in Matal v. Tam would not meet the 
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obscenity standard because it is not sexual in nature.  As such, narrowing “scandalous” to mean 
obscene modes of expression is under-inclusive for Justice Sotomayor’s purposes. In order to 
sufficiently narrow “scandalous,” profanity and vulgarity must be considered as modes of 
expression independent from viewpoint.  
ii. The Supreme Court’s treatment of profanity and vulgarity has been 
inconsistent and inconclusive  
The Court has been inconsistent in its case law both as to whether profanity and vulgarity 
are modes of expression and as to whether the government may regulate profanity and vulgarity.  
Cohen sets forth several arguments as to why profanity and vulgarity are important aspects of 
viewpoint and should not be considered mere modes of expression.  While FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation has contradicted Cohen on some grounds, the Court has not regularly applied the 
reasoning from Pacifica Foundation to other cases and the reasoning seems to be limited to the 
context of the broadcast medium.  Since Pacifica Foundation, the Court has not articulated a 
definite stance on modes of expression and their regulation.  
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court upheld the ability of the Federal 
Communications Commission to prohibit and punish indecent language over television and 
radio.155  The case arose out of a radio station in New York playing comedian George Carlin’s 
monologue on the “seven dirty words.”156  The Court held that while the government could not 
prohibit these words, it could ban them from being aired over the broadcast media, stating that 
“patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only 
in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly 
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outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”157  The Court weighed in favor of regulation 
because broadcasting is accessible to children, “even those too young to read.”158  Justice Harlan, 
writing for the majority, expressly stated that if the government’s regulation of Carlin’s offensive 
monologue “could be traced to its political content . . . First Amendment protection might be 
required.”159  In his opinion, Justice Harlan thus drew a distinction between the message and the 
mode of expression, namely the use of profanity and vulgarity, but still left open the possibility 
that First Amendment protections could apply if the regulation were tied to viewpoint.  
At first glance, the Pacifica Foundation decision seems to support Justice Sotomayor’s 
position that vulgarity and profanity are modes of expression.  The Pacifica Foundation decision 
seems to be at odds with Cohen.  For one, it suggests that the Court can cleanse the broadcast 
media in order to make it safe for children, something that Cohen expressly rejected in the public 
realm.  Justice Harlan even seemed to distinguish between mode of expression and content; Cohen 
v. California cast doubts on such distinctions.  The case also suggests that Cohen may not be set 
in stone.  Pointing to Pacifica Foundation, Justice Sotomayor may say that while her reasoning 
seems to contradict the Court’s dicta from Cohen, the Court has also contradicted Cohen in the 
past.  The fact that the Court appeared to distinguish Cohen in Pacifica Foundation can thus lend 
credence to Justice Sotomayor’s treatment of Cohen.  
Unfortunately for Justice Sotomayor, the Court seems reluctant to expand Pacifica 
Foundation, as it has not been willing to extend it beyond the free radio broadcast medium.  For 
example, in Sable Communications v. FCC, the Court held that it is unconstitutional for a federal 
statute, designed to eliminate the “dial-a-porn” industry, to prohibit indecent speech.160  The Court 
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rested its decision on a lack of a “captive audience” as callers were generally willing listeners.161  
Additionally, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. the Court used strict scrutiny 
to declare unconstitutional a provision of the Cable Act regulating sexual speech.162  The Cable 
Act intended to limit the broadcast of sexually explicit channels to certain hours in order to prevent 
signal bleed—a situation where people receive images from cable channels to which they do not 
subscribe.163  The Court held that the law was content-based discrimination as it applied only to 
non-obscene sexual images, but not to any other type of images.164  The law did not survive strict 
scrutiny, because there were other less restrictive measures the government could have 
employed.165  Given that the Court was unwilling to extend Pacifica’s reasoning to cable 
television, it is unlikely that the Court would extend Pacifica to trademark registration.  
Nevertheless, Pacifica appears to set out a distinction between viewpoint and mode of expression 
when it comes to profanity and vulgarity.   
Since Pacifica Foundation, Justice Stevens seemed to have been a proponent of separating 
mode of expression from content or viewpoint.  In his concurrence in Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
Public Service Commission of New York, Justice Stevens argued that there are two types of 
offensiveness: offensiveness independent of the message of the speaker, and offensiveness because 
the listener disagrees with the speaker.166  He argued that offensiveness of form, or mode of 
expression, can be appropriate for regulation.167  In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. the 
majority struck down a federal statute that prohibited sending unsolicited advertisements for 
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contraceptives through the mail.168  Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence that he agreed with 
the majority because the law regulates “communications for their ideas or for their style.”  He 
stated, however that “regulations of form and context may strike a constitutionally appropriate 
balance” between the speaker’s right to express a message and a listener’s interest in “the quality 
of his environment.”169  Justice Stevens seemed to be drawing a distinction between mode of 
expression and ideas or content, and asserting that in some instances limiting a speaker’s freedom 
of expression can be appropriate.   
At the same time, there are several examples of Justices advocating that mode of expression 
cannot be separated from the viewpoint or the message.  Justice Harlan’s opinion in Cohen is one 
example.  Another is Justice Brennan’s dissent in Pacifica, where he stated that the idea that the 
message is separable from the “vehicle for its expression” is “transparently fallacious.”170  Justice 
O'Connor in her opinion for the Court in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. stated that there may be cases 
where “banning the means of expression so interferes with the message that it essentially bans the 
message.”171  These Justices suggest that the mode of expression is sufficiently linked to the 
message or viewpoint that regulating one will affect the other.     
In short, the Supreme Court has not applied the distinction between mode of expression 
and the viewpoint of the speaker “in a proper and systematic manner.”172  The Court is unclear as 
to whether mode of expression can be separated from the content or the message.  If it can, the 
Court is further unclear on how modes of expression ought to be treated.  Over the years, the 
Justices have either not touched on the issue, or have had diverging opinions.  On the current Court, 
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the notion that mode of expression can be separated from the content or the message seems to have 
support from Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, Roberts, and Alito.  The other Justices did not discuss 
the issue in Iancu v. Brunetti.  It appears to be an open question.  
V. Lessons from Communication Theory 
Professor Howard, while arguing that mode of expression can be separated from the 
content and ideas, stated that “some modes of expression may be so intertwined with the particular 
message” that “requiring the speaker to alter his mode of expression runs the risk of altering the 
message itself.”173  He considers the example of Picasso’s painting, Guernica.174  He admits that 
it is “hard to conceive of separating the mode of the expression from the message” of Guernica.175  
At the same time, however, he suggests that “it is conceivable that one could articulate in words 
the gist of what Picasso intended to communicate about the Spanish Civil War when he painted 
Guernica.”176  Communication theory seems to suggest, however, that any attempt at describing 
what Picasso communicated through Guernica in words would be vastly under-inclusive.  A 
painting says more than a paragraph of words.  Furthermore, even if one could find words to fully 
describe Guernica, the medium used would inevitably affect the way people view it.  For example, 
a glance at Guernica the painting would give a larger sense of what Picasso was trying to 
communicate than a glance at Guernica the book.  Given the dearth of consistent Supreme Court 
precedent, the question that needs answering is whether changing or regulating the modes of 
expression affects the message or viewpoint of the speaker.    
 





 Marshall McLuhan’s seminal book, The Medium is the Massage, argues that the medium 
is more important in communication than the message itself.177  While heavily focused on how 
communications media were influenced by emerging technologies, McLuhan argues that 
“[s]ocieties have always been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men communicate 
than by the content of the communication.”178  McLuhan’s starting point is that all media are an 
extension of a human faculty.179  As such, media evoke “unique ratios of sense perception,” such 
that the extension of “one sense alters the way we think and act.”180  Illustrating his point with the 
example of the alphabet and the printing press, he argues that prior to those technologies the key 
human faculty and the “dominant organ of sensory and social orientation” was the ear.181  In those 
times, people lived in an “acoustic space” where speech was the main source of information.182    
Then came the alphabet and the printing press. Both fundamentally changed the way 
societies think by fostering “a process of specialism and of detachment.”183  The two technologies 
created “the portable book” which could be read in privacy and isolation.184  Literacy enabled 
people to have the “power of detachment” and “non-involvement.”185  By its very structure the 
alphabet—a “construct of fragmented bits and parts which have no semantic meaning in 
themselves”—forced people to think linearly and be dependent on the “presentation of connected 
and sequential facts or concepts.”186   
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 Electronic circuitry profoundly changed the way society thinks once again.  McLuhan 
declared that people now live in a “global village . . . a simultaneous happening.”187  Electric 
circuitry “involves men with one another.”188  Gone are the days of reading a book or newspaper 
in isolation; today “information pours upon us, instantaneously and continuously.”189  McLuhan 
argued that people can no longer be limited with linear “block-by-block, step-by-step” thinking, 
as instantaneous communication makes sure that “all factors of the environment and of experience 
coexist in a state of active interplay.”190  To McLuhan, the idea that the message, idea, or content 
of communication can be separated from the medium is an impossibility.  The way people think is 
firmly linked to the medium of communication and people often do not fully appreciate how the 
medium affects the message.    
 While the “mode of expression” discussed by Justice Sotomayor in Brunetti refers to a 
slightly different concept than the “medium” discussed by McLuhan, McLuhan’s principles are 
still valid in analyzing Justice Sotomayor’s argument.  In the same sense that medium has a 
profound effect on communication, the mode of expression has a profound effect on the message 
or viewpoint of speech.  The key concept from McLuhan’s book is not merely that the medium is 
the message, but rather that the medium is often not thought about.  People tend not to think about 
how they received information but focus on the information itself.  This creates an environment 
where manipulating the way a certain message is received can change the message itself, and, in 
turn, perhaps create a more powerful message.  Profanity and vulgarity do not simply amplify a 
message, they change it.  
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 In the context of art, the mode of expression cannot be separated from the content or the 
message of an art piece.  According to Amy Sabrin, mode of expression comprises the means by 
which subject matter and viewpoint are expressed.191  She argues that whether the style or form 
enhances or interferes with the viewpoint is “perhaps the most important factor—and often the 
most debated one . . ..”192  Sabrin also discusses the role offensiveness plays in artistic endeavors.  
Sabrin states that even art that expresses “repulsive” views, such as art that is sexist, racist or 
violent, can have “technical,” merit.193  She uses Leni Riefenstahl's pro-Hitler propaganda films 
of World War II and some rap music and music videos as examples of works that express repulsive 
and offensive views, but have artistic merit.194  The more fundamental problem with disqualifying 
offensive viewpoints is that viewpoint is “perhaps the most subjective element of content.”195  It 
is precisely the types of work that offend that “may be intentionally or unintentionally complex, 
contradictory, or ambiguous.”196  In short, she argues that it is hard to separate the offensiveness 
from the message, when offensiveness may be the message or a major component of the message.    
 Considering McLuhan’s and Sabrin’s works in tandem begins to demonstrate the 
difficulties of separating mode of expression and viewpoint.  As an example, consider the 
California band, The Slants, from Matal v. Tam.  While the name refers to a derogatory term, the 
band believe that the name will help reclaim the term and “drain its denigrating force.”197  
McLuhan would argue that the band chose to express a message in a certain way—through 
trademark registration and the use of a racial slur—and the medium chosen is just as important as 
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the message itself.  Applying McLuhan’s idea of media evoking “ratios of sense perception,” 
profanity and the medium of trademark registration offer “The Slants” a mode of expression like 
no other.  The trademark necessarily means that “The Slants” name will always be associated with 
the band,198 and the offensiveness gives the band a wider reach than an inoffensive trademark 
could.  The fact that bloggers and commentators are engaged in a public discussion about the 
band’s name is indicative of that fact.  While it is true that there are other ways of “drain[ing] the 
denigrating force” from a racial slur, it is also hard to conceive of a way to express exactly what 
the band aimed to express by calling themselves “The Slants” through other modes of expression 
without sacrificing meaning, message, and viewpoint.  Sabrin would similarly argue that the 
offensiveness of the name “The Slants” serves a purpose.  It is doubtful that regulating the mode 
of expression would not also tamper with that purpose.    
 The use of offensive language serves many functions that help further reinforce the author’s 
or speaker’s message and ideas.  One example of such a phenomenon is in the context of political 
campaigns.  An Italian study decided to try to pin down the effects of swearing and vulgar language 
on voters during a hypothetical local election.199  A sample of the electorate was split up and given 
one of two blog posts by a hypothetical local politician.200  One blog post contained vulgar 
language, while the other contained “neutral” language.201  The study found that using vulgar 
language in a blog post generally increased the perceived informality of a source and “improved 
the impression about the source.”202  Citing Marshall McLuhan, the study found that when “the 
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source is the message” and informality is perceived by voters as “a positive surprise,” swearing 
and profanity can be a useful method of getting political consensus.203  The study also suggests 
that the positive effect of vulgarity seems to apply to the whole electorate.204  The effects “did not 
vary as a function of participants’ gender, education, involvement in politics, and self-reported 
position on the left–right political spectrum.”205  In the political sphere, profanity and vulgarity 
can serve important functions that help define the politician and his or her ideas and viewpoints.   
 Another example of the effective use of vulgarity is in the television series South Park.  
While South Park often employs “lewd toilet humor,” it often addresses important, contemporary 
issues.206  Joe Thorogood argues that the two sides of South Park—the serious, political side and 
the toilet humor side—actually feed off of each other.  He argues that the lewd humor is “a central 
and vital technique” that creates a unique sense of satire that does not resemble “conventional 
political humor.”207  South Park consistently blends the trashy and lewd with geopolitics and social 
commentary.208    
Thorogood asserts that the use of profanity to tackle important issues has deep historical 
roots, and points to the writings of Mikheal Bakhtin, an early 20th century writer whose writings 
employed infantile humor.209  Bakhtin wrote about the concept of “carnival,” a situation where 
“frivolity and chaos associated with carnival celebrations invert the normal functioning of 
order.”210  He also developed the idea of “body grotesque,” a lowering of what is perceived as high 
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culture to the level of the lewd in the form of bodily functions.211  Bakhtin and Thorogood argue 
that such methods contained “revolutionary potential,” as in the face of carnival and body 
grotesque social hierarchy faded away and was replaced with a sense of equality.212    
 South Park, according to Thorogood, is a modern continuation of the themes of carnival 
and body grotesque.  In one notable episode, one of South Park’s main characters attempts to pin 
the fault for the September 11, 2001 attacks on one of his classmates.213  This premise leads to an 
episode exploring the concepts of 9/11 conspiracy theories.214  In the process, the episode includes 
images of a United States president killing a leader of a 9/11 conspiracy organization, a student 
defecating in a school bathroom, and images of the Twin Towers in flames with a primary school 
student’s face superimposed on the wreckage.215  All of these images can be patently offensive. 
Yet, the body grotesque and carnival aspects enhance the episode’s messages and viewpoints, 
whatever one might think of them.  Through lewd humor South Park explores the United States 
government’s fear of geopolitical threats from within its borders, the government’s fragility and 
incompetence after 9/11, and the ridiculous nature of conspiracy theories.216  South Park’s creators, 
Trey Parker and Matt Stone, spoke about their dislike of conspiracy theories in the episode 
commentary.217  They consciously decided that rather than rationally debunk conspiracy theories, 
as has been done before, they would lower them to a lewd and childish level.218  There is no doubt 
that the mode of expression could be described as offensive, but insisting that South Park and its 
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creator’s express their viewpoint in a non-offensive way would deprive them of a powerful tool 
for expressing their viewpoint.   
 Regulating the mode of expression inevitably affects viewpoint. Swearing can be a 
powerful tool for politicians, and toilet humor can be a powerful tool for expressing viewpoints 
and opinions.  Justice Sotomayor stated in Iancu v. Brunetti that “[r]estrictions on particular modes 
of expression do not inherently qualify as viewpoint discrimination; they are not by nature 
examples of the government target[ing] . . . particular views taken by speakers on a subject.”219  
This statement rests on two key assumptions: (1) that modes of expression are separable from 
viewpoint and (2) that the modes of expression in question, namely obscenity, vulgarity and 
profanity, as defined by Justice Sotomayor, do not express a viewpoint.  As to the first assumption, 
whether in the context of mass media or in the context of art, the mode or way of expressing a 
message seems to be intertwined with the message or viewpoint itself.  As to the second 
assumption, vulgarity and profanity are and can be used in various contexts in ways that enhance 
and express the viewpoint.    
VI. Conclusion 
Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti presented a clash of First Amendment ideologies 
between the Justices on the current Supreme Court.  The key issue is one of viewpoint neutrality.  
In Brunetti, the majority of the Court, namely Justices Kagan, Thomas, Ginsburg, Gorsuch, and 
Kavanaugh, held that if a law regulates ideas that offend, then it is a viewpoint-based regulation.220  
Justices Alito, Roberts, Breyer, and Sotomayor, in their various dissents and concurrences suggest 
that regulating all offensive, vulgar, or profane speech is viewpoint neutral.  According to them, a 
law that regulates vulgar, profane, or obscene modes of expression does not regulate viewpoint 
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because it does not take sides.  It regulates evenhandedly, regardless of “particular” views on a 
subject.221  These two views are at odds with each other and are explored in this Comment within 
the context of the Lanham Act.    
Justice Sotomayor argues in her dissent in Iancu v. Brunetti that by separating the “immoral 
and scandalous” standard in the Lanham Act into two distinct standards, the word “scandalous” 
could be defined to only regulate the mode of expressing a trademark rather than the viewpoint or 
message of the applicant.  Justice Sotomayor suggested defining “scandalous” to proscribe modes 
of expression that are obscene, vulgar, and profane.  Such a content-based but viewpoint-neutral 
construction would allow the government to regulate a government program or a government 
subsidy scheme.  The immediate problem with Justice Sotomayor’s argument is that Supreme 
Court precedent is unclear as to whether trademark registration constitutes a government program 
or a government subsidy.  Even if trademarks were a government subsidy or a government 
program, the question remains whether regulating solely modes of expression is constitutionally 
permissible and whether it would truly result in viewpoint neutrality.  
First, there is a dearth of Supreme Court precedent addressing whether the mode of 
expression is a distinct aspect of speech and, if so, how such an aspect ought to be treated by 
regulators.  Second, the available precedent shows that when the Court has addressed modes of 
expression, it has done so in an inconsistent and inconclusive manner.  After the Brunetti decision 
Congress is left without guidance in the task of rewriting the Lanham Act.  This Comment argues 
that such a narrowing construction would not alleviate the First Amendment problems facing the 
Lanham Act.  More broadly, the mode of expression, while a distinct part of speech, cannot be 
cleanly separated from the message or viewpoint of the speaker.  
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As suggested by communication theory, even if modes of expression were cleanly 
separable from viewpoint, regulating or prohibiting certain modes of expression would inevitably 
affect viewpoint.  Communication theory does not support Justice Sotomayor’s argument that 
obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity can be redefined as viewpoint neutral modes of communication.  
Profanity and vulgarity are chosen by the speaker to convey a specific message.  For example, the 
message in Picasso’s Guernica could be conveyed in various ways.  Yet Guernica would not be 
able to convey Picasso’s viewpoint as eloquently and accurately if Picasso were limited to only 
certain colors or to only drawing animals, not human figures.  Would Simon Tam’s band convey 
the same message and viewpoint if they were not called The Slants?  Would Erik Brunetti’s 
streetwear brand convey the same ethos if it were not named FUCT?  The vulgarity and profanity 
of these names greatly contribute to the messages and viewpoints behind them.  Ultimately, as 
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